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During recent years the significance of the concept of
human error has changed considerably. The reason for
this has partly been an increasing interest of
psychological research in the analysis of complex real
life phenomena, and partly the changes of modern work
conditions caused by advanced information technology.
Consequently, the topic of the present contribution is not
a definition of the concept or a proper taxonomy.
Instead, a review is given of two professional contexts
for which the concept of error is important. Three cases
of analysis of human–system interaction are reviewed:
(1) traditional task analysis and human reliability
estimation; (2) causal analysis of accidents after the
fact, and (3) design of reliable work conditions in
modern sociotechnical systems. It is concluded that
“errors” cannot be studied as a separate category of
behaviour fragments; the object of study should be
cognitive control of behaviour in complex environments.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
TRADITIONAL TASK ANALYSIS AND
HUMAN RELIABILITY ESTIMATION
Human activities in traditional work environ-
ments can be described in terms of repetitive
tasks, i.e. sequences of acts in control of some
equipment or tool. Manufacturing systems were
normally planned for effective and economic
operation over long periods of time. Planned or
normal work sequences had time to settle into
stable patterns which could be identified during
design by analysis of the task, to control tools and
equipment, or afterwards by field studies. Since
successful operation during production or a mis-
sion was of fundamental interest, technical and
human reliability analysis became important
design tools both for military and high hazard
industrial operations.
In this situation, human errors can easily be
defined; normative sequences of proper acts are
available for reference and errors can be identified
and recorded. As long as actors enter the proper
sequence at all, errors caused by lack of resources
or proper intention are of minor importance and
errors can be studied in terms of their overt
effects (Swain’s Therp method).1 In modern
workplaces people are frequently moved to super-
visory tasks and decision making. In that case,
reliability analysis is focused on the less well
structured and stable tasks of diagnosis and con-
tingency planning. Focus of error analysis is
moved back from overt acts to decision functions
and further on to psychological mechanisms (fig
1).
It is a remarkable fact that, given a particular
sequence of human acts, taxonomies of error
analysis resulting from detailed analysis of actual
cases of incidents and accidents and from
psychological laboratory research show definitive
convergent properties.2 When a particular task
sequence can be taken as reference (i.e. a
sequence which is functionally constrained by the
equipment to be operated or firmly established by
training), a failure-mode-and-effect analysis is a
very feasible approach to identify the hazards
presented by human error. It will be effective dur-
ing design to ensure error tolerance, even if quan-
titative reliability prediction may not be realistic.3
A necessary precondition is, however, that the
sequence in which the “error” is analysed can be
taken for granted. This is the case only when we
are involved in a local analysis focused on the
immediate human–machine interface: we then
try to predict the risk involved in the operation of
some particular technological system of a known
design. The acceptable work procedure is identi-
fied from the functional requirements of equip-
ment, given a definite goal. This is, as noted, a
reasonable assumption if the task is repetitive,
which was the normal case in established
technology. In addition, we are dealing with a
human link in an extended chain of events; the
“error” is a link in the chain, in most cases not the
origin of the course of events. This kind of analy-
sis and, consequently, definition of error is
completely inadequate when we are dealing with
design or improvement of large scale sociotechni-
cal systems. In general, we do not have a simple
causal trace deflected from its intended course
toward one goal. Actually, such a separate trace is
the manifestation of the dynamic flow of events
in a complex network involving several goals and
side effects and many side branches. Previous
flows of events along these branches serve to pre-
condition the “riverbed” in which the dynamic
flow is found.
CAUSAL ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENTS AFTER
THE FACT
In this case, we are analysing an accidental chain
of events upstream from an accident in order to
understand why it happened; to find somebody to
blame, who did it; or to find out how to improve
the system. We are trying to describe a particular
course of events and to identify the particular
causal trace in which human error is embedded.
Accidents are normally analysed in terms of
accidental chains of events, i.e. causal representa-
tions. Since no two accidents will be identical,
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accident analysis will depend on prototypical categories of
causes, events, and consequences.4 An explicit representation
of elements in the physical world makes causal analysis a very
effective technique for identifying and representing accidental
conditions. It is, however, important to consider the implicit
frame of reference of a causal analysis.
The behaviour of the complex, real world is a continuous,
dynamic flow which can only be explained in causal terms
after decomposition into discrete events. The concept of a
causal interaction of events and objects depends on a catego-
rization of human observations and experiences. Perception of
occurrences as events in causal connection does not depend on
categories which are defined by lists of objective attributes, but
on categories which are identified by typical examples,
prototypes.5 This is the case for objects as well as for events.
Everybody knows perfectly well what “a cup” is. To define it
objectively by a list of attributes that separates cups from jars,
vases, and bowls is no trivial problem. It has, for instance, been
faced in many attempts to design computer programs for pic-
ture analysis. The problem is that the property of being “a cup”
is not a feature of an isolated object, but depends on the con-
text of human needs and experience. The identification of
events in the same way depends on the relationship in which
they appear in a causal statement. An objective definition,
therefore, will be circular.
In the analysis of accidents, decomposition of the dynamic
flow of changes will normally terminate when a sequence is
found including events which match the prototypes familiar
to the analysis. The resulting explanation will take for granted
his or her frame of reference and, in general, only what he or
she finds to be unusual will be included: the less familiar the
context, the more detailed the decomposition. By means of the
analysis, a causal path is found upstream from the accidental
effect. This path will be prepared by resident conditions which
are latent effects of earlier events or acts. Also, the resident
conditions can be explained by causal back tracking, in this
case branches in the path are found. To explain the accident,
these branches are also traced backward until all conditions
are explained by abnormal, but familiar, events or acts. The
point is: How does the degree of decomposition of the causal
explanation and the selection of the side branches depend on
the circumstances of the analysis? Another question is: What
is the stop rule applied for termination of the search for
causes? Ambiguous and implicit stop rules will make the
results of analysis very sensitive to the topics discussed in the
professional community at any given time (fig 2). There is a
tendency to see what is expected; during one period technical
faults were in focus as causes of accidents, then human errors
predominated, while in the future focus will probably move
upstream to designers and managers.
The perception of stop rules is very important in the control
of causal explanations. Every student knows the relief felt
when finding a list of solutions to mathematical problems.Not
that it gave the path to solution to any great extent, but it gave
a clear stop rule for the search for possible mistakes, overseen
preconditions, and calculation errors. The result: hours saved
and peace of mind. A more professional example to the same
point is given by Kuhn.7 He mentions the fact that chemical
research was able to come up with whole number relations
between elements of chemical substances only after the
acceptance of John Dalton’s chemical atom theory. There had
been no stop rule for efforts to refine the experimental
technique until the acceptance of this theory.
Stop rules are not usually formulated explicitly. The search
will typically be terminated pragmatically in one of the
following ways: (a) an event will be accepted as a cause and
the search terminated if the causal path can no longer be fol-
lowed because information is missing; (b) when a familiar,
abnormal event is found to be a reasonable explanation; or ©
if a cure is available. The dependence of the stop rule upon
familiarity and the availability of a cure makes the judgement
very dependent upon the role in which a judge finds himself.
An operator, a supervisor, a designer, and a legal judge may
very likely reach different conclusions.
To summarize: identification of accident causes is controlled
by pragmatic, subjective stop rules. These rules depend on the
aim of the analysis, i.e. whether the aim is to explain the
course of events, to allocate responsibility and blame, or to
identify possible system improvements in order to avoid future
accidents.
Analysis of explanation
In an analysis to explain an accident, the backtracking will be
continued until a cause is found which is familiar to the ana-
lysts. If a technical component fails, a component fault will
only be accepted as the prime cause if the failure of the
particular type of component appears to be “as usual”. Further
search will probably be made if the consequences of the fault
make the designer’s choice of component quality unreason-
able, or if a reasonable operator could have terminated the
effect had he been more alert or been trained better. In such a
Figure 1 An illustration of the human involvement in a causal
sequence of events. The event of human error is decomposed to
identify the cognitive task element and the psychological mechanism
involved in the error. At this level of detail, an event in the work
context activates a particular psychological mechanism which
influences the immediate decision task required by the work. A
decision error in turn introduces an error in the overt action
sequence, with unacceptable consequences for the work goal. Two
aspects are essential in the present context. One is that human
“error” very frequently will be a link in a sequence, not the origin.
Secondly, “errors” can be categorized at different states in the flow.
This representation is well suited for failure-mode-and-effect analysis
in the interface of technical systems: the various psychological “error
mechanisms” are folded on to the cognitive task from which the
effects, in turn, are folded on to functional system properties for
evaluation of the acceptability of consequences.
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Figure 2 An illustration of a causal explanation of a driving
accident. The flow of behaviour is decomposed into chains of events.
Note that only abnormal or unusual events together with violations of
rules are included. The normal activities conditioning the path are
not included. Furthermore, decomposition and causal backtracking
stop at events which are taken to be “reasonable explanations”.
Adapted from Leplat and Rasmussen.6
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case, a design or manufacturing error, respectively, or an
operator error can be found.
In most recent reviews of larger industrial accidents it has
been found that human errors played an important role in the
course of events. Frequently, errors are attributed to operators
involved in the dynamic flow of events. This can be an effect of
the very nature of the causal explanation. Human error is,
particularly at present, familiar to analysts: to err is human,
and highly skilled people will frequently depart from norma-
tive procedures, as we will see subsequently.
Analysis for allocation of responsibility
In order to allocate responsibility, the stop rule of the
backward tracing of events will be to identify a person who
has made an error and at the same time was “in control” of his
or her acts. The very nature of the causal explanation will
focus attention on people directly and dynamically involved in
the flow of abnormal events. This is unfortunate because they
may very well be in a situation where they do not have “con-
trol”. Traditionally, a person is not considered responsible if
physically forced to act by another person or when subject to
disorders such as epileptic attacks. In such cases, acts are
involuntary8 9 from a judgement based on physical or physio-
logical factors. It is, however, a question as to whether cogni-
tive psychological factors also should be taken more into
account when judging responsibility. Inadequate response of
operators to unfamiliar events depends very much on the con-
ditioning taking place during normal work. This problem also
raises the question of the nature of human error. The
behaviour of operators is conditioned by the conscious
decisions made by work planners or managers. They will be
more “responsible” than an operator in the dynamic flow of
events. However, their decisions may not be considered during
a causal analysis after an accident because they are “normal
events” which are not usually represented in an accident
analysis. Furthermore, they can be missed in analysis because
they are to be found in a conditioning side branch of the causal
tree, not in the path involved in the dynamic flow.
Present technological development toward high hazard
systems requires a very careful consideration by designers of
the effects of “human errors” which are commonplace in nor-
mal daily activities, but unacceptable in large scale systems.
There is considerable danger that systematic traps can be
arranged for people in the dynamic course of events. The
present concept of “responsibility” should be reconsidered
from a cognitive point of view, as should the ambiguity of stop
rules in causal analysis.
Analysis for system improvements
Analysis for therapeutic purpose, i.e. for system improvement,
will require a different focus with respect to selection of the
causal network and of the stop rule. The stop rule will now be
related to the question of whether an effective cure is known.
Frequently, cure will be associated with events perceived to be
root causes. In general, however, the effects of accidental
courses of events can be avoided by breaking or blocking any
link in the causal tree or its conditioning branches.
Explanatory descriptions of accidents are, as mentioned,
focused on the unusual events. However, the path can also be
broken by changing normal events and functions involved.
The decomposition of the flow of events, therefore, should not
focus solely on unusual events, but should also include normal
activities.
The aim is to find conditions sensitive to improvements.
Improvements imply that some person in the system makes
decisions differently in the future. How do we systematically
identify persons and decisions in a (normal) situation where it
would be psychologically feasible to ask for a change in
behaviour, when reports from accidents focus only on the flow
of unusual events? An approach to such an analysis for
improving safety has been discussed elsewhere.6
In conclusion, the choice of stop rules for the analysis of
accidents is normally left to the subjective judgement of the
analyst, depending heavily on the aim of his analysis. Analyses
made for one purpose may therefore be misleading for other
purposes.
DESIGN OF RELIABLE WORK CONDITIONS AND
SOCIOTECHNICAL SYSTEMS
Modern work conditions
A number of problems are met when attempts are made to
improve the safety of sociotechnical systems from analyses
tied to particular paths of accidental events. This is due to the
fact that each path is a particular token shaped by higher
order relational structures. If changes are introduced to
remove the conditions for the existence of a particular link in
the chain, odds are that this particular situation will never
occur again.We should be fighting types of accident causation,
not these individual tokens. Only in the immediate interface
with technical systems is human behaviour constrained in a
way that makes the chain of events reasonably predictable.
The farther away from the technical core we are, the more
degrees of freedom agents will have in their mode of
behaviour. Consequently, the less certain is the reference in
terms of normal or proper behaviour for judging “errors”. This
problem is becoming increasingly important as modern
manufacturing systems and organizations are forced to
respond to increasingly dynamic market requirements,
technological innovations, and legal constraints.
Given this situation, improvements of safety features of a
sociotechnical system depend on a global analysis: no longer
can we assume the time course of human behaviour to be pre-
dictable. Tasks will be formed for the occasion, and design for
improvements must be based on attempts to find means of
control at higher levels than that of particular task procedures.
If, for instance, sociotechnical systems have features of adap-
tation and self-organization, changes which aim to improve
safety at the individual task level might well be compared with
attempts to control the temperature in a room with a thermo-
stat controlled heater by opening the window. In other words,
it is not sensible to try to change the performance of a
feedback system by alterations inside the loop; you have to
identify mechanisms that are sensitive, i.e. related to the con-
trol reference itself.
Some basic high level features of “human error” in a flexible
sociotechnical system are related to the dependence of human
performance on features such as: (1) learning and adaptation;
(2) conflicts among cognitive control structures; (3) resource
limitations; and finally, (4) stochastic variability. An attempt
to develop guidelines for the design of human-work interfaces
has been presented elsewhere.10
Human adaptation
In all work situations constraints are found which must be
respected in order to perform satisfactorily. There are,
however, also many degrees of freedom which have to be
resolved at the worker’s discretion. In stable work conditions,
know-how will develop which represents prior decisions and
choice and the perceived degrees of behavioural freedom will
ultimately be very limited, i.e. “normal ways” of doing this will
emerge, and the process of adaptation will no longer confuse
the concept of error. By contrast, in modern, flexible, and
dynamic work conditions, the immediate degrees of freedom
will have to be continuously resolved. This implies that effec-
tive work performance includes continuous awareness of the
available degrees of freedom together with effective strategies
for making choices, ahead of the task of controlling the chosen
path to a goal. This changes the concept of error in a very fun-
damental way.
The behaviour in work of individuals (and, consequently,
also of organizations) is, by definition, oriented towards the
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requirements of the work environment as perceived by the
individual. Work requirements, what should be done, will nor-
mally be perceived in terms of control of the state of affairs in
the work environment according to a goal, i.e.why it should be
done. How these changes are made is, to a certain degree, at
the discretion of the agent.
The alternative acceptable work activities, how to work, will
be shaped by the work environment which defines the
boundaries of the range of possibilities, i.e. acceptable work
strategies. This range of possibilities will be further bounded
by the resource profile of the particular agent in terms of tools
available, knowledge (competence), information about state
of affairs, and processing capacity. The presence of alternatives
for action depends on a many-to-many mapping between
means and ends present in the work situation as perceived by
the individual; in general, several functions can serve the
individual goals and each of the functions can be imple-
mented by different tools and physical processes. If this was
not the case, the work environment would be totally predeter-
mined and there would be no need for human choice or deci-
sion (figs 3 and 4).
Within the area of acceptable work performance, between
the boundaries defined by the work requirements on one side
and the individual resource profile on the other, considerable
degrees of freedom are still left for the individual to choose
among strategies and to implement them in particular
sequences of behaviour. These degrees of freedom must be
eliminated by the choice of an agent to finally enter a particu-
lar course of action. The different ways to accomplish work can
be categorized in terms of strategies, defined as types of
behavioural sequences which are similar in some well defined
aspects, such as the physical process applied in work and the
related tools, or, for mental strategies, the underlying kind of
mental representation and the level of interpretation of
perceived information. In any particular situation-dependent
exemplar of actual performance, a token will emerge which is
an implementation of the chosen strategy under the influence
of the complexity of detail in the environment. The particular
token of performance will be unique and impossible to
predict, whereas the strategy chosen will, in principle, be pre-
dictable. This choice made by individual agents depends on
subjective performance criteria related to the process of work,
such as time spent, cognitive strain, joy, cost of failure, etc. In
general, the freedom to choose work strategy is very important
as a means to resolve resource-demand conflicts met during
performance.
Modelling work activity from this point of view depends on
identification of the range of acceptable and possible work
strategies (i.e. prototypical sets of behaviour sequences), the
human resource profile, and the subjective criteria governing
the resolution of the remaining degrees of freedom in
different work scenarios. Some work requirements are explicit
and discrete, with specified limits of acceptance. Other
requirements are formulated as optimizing criteria serving to
resolve ambiguity in goal specification, such as the request to
reach a solution which is as cheap or as safe as possible. Such
product criteria, together with the subjective process criteria,
will necessarily lead to an adaptive behaviour seeking to opti-
mize performance according to the criteria, along with evolu-
tion of training and expertise (fig 5).
Adaptation, self-organization, and error
It follows directly from this discussion that the structuring of
work processes through on-the-job training by an individual
will be a self-organizing, evolutionary process, simply because
an optimizing search is the only way in which the large
number of degrees of freedom in a complex situation can be
resolved. The basic synchronization to the work requirements
can be based on procedures learned from an instructor or a
more experienced colleague, or it can sometimes be planned
by the individual in a knowledge based mode of reasoning by
means of mental experiments. From here, the smoothness and
speed characterizing high professional skill, together with a
large repertoire of heuristic know-how rules, will evolve
through an adaptation process in which “errors” are unavoid-
able side effects of the exploration of the boundaries of
acceptable performance. During this adaptation, performance
Figure 3 Human behaviour is governed by constraints which must
be respected by the actors for the work performance to be
successful. Identification of such constraints will specify the “space”
in which the human can navigate freely. Violation of the constraints
will be considered human error or task violation in the usual sense.
For successful performance, humans have to navigate between two
boundaries of constraints. One boundary is given by the control
requirements posed by the system. The other constraining boundary
is given by the human resource profile which depends on individual
characteristics such as competence, mental capacity, physical
strength, etc. Navigation within the envelope specified by these
boundaries will depend on subjective criteria for choice, such as aim
to save time, to spare memory load, to have fun, to explore new
land, etc.
Space of possibilities; degrees of
freedom to be resolved according
to subjective preferences
Boundary of acceptable
state of affairs
Boundary of available
means of work
Boundary of individual
resource profile
Figure 4 An example: the activities involved in going to work. The
work given constraints are related to the location, the time of arrival,
and the probability of delays. Constraints in means are defined by
the transport alternatives, i.e. to take the tube, a taxi, or to drive by
yourself. The subjective process criterion determining your choice
depends on economy, your husband or wife’s request to bring some
grocery and, maybe, consideration of the time spent, the likelihood
of traffic jams. Given the decision to drive by yourself, the choice of
route depends on the secondary task of shopping, of your joy with a
particular scenery, and the traffic density. Finally, en route, the
speed you choose depends on traffic given constraints, on formal
conditions such as speed limits or your husband or wife’s anxiety,
and ultimately “sporty” criteria related to your driving skill, i.e. to
drive fast with smooth gear changes.
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will be optimized according to the individual’s subjective
process criteria, within the boundary of his individual
resources. This complex adaptation of performance to work
requirements, eliminating the necessity of continuous choice,
will result in stereotype practices depending on the individual
performance criteria of the agents. These criteria will be
significantly influenced by the social norms and culture of the
group and organization.
Conflict will probably be found between global work goals
and the effect of local adaptation according to subjective proc-
ess criteria. Unfortunately, the perception of process quality
can be immediate and unconditional, while the effect on
product quality of the choice of actor can be considerably
delayed, obscure and frequently conditional with respect to
many other factors.
In a first encounter, when representation of work con-
straints is not present in the form of instructions from an
experienced colleague or a teacher, and know-how from
previous experiences is not available, the constraints of the
work have to be explored in a knowledge based mode from
explicit consideration of the actual goal and a functional
understanding of the relational structure of the work content.
For such initial exploration as well as for problem solving dur-
ing unusual task conditions, opportunities for tests of hypoth-
eses and trial-and-error learning are important. It is typically
expected that qualified personnel such as process operators
check their diagnostic hypotheses conceptually—by thought
experiments—before actual operations if acts are likely to be
irreversible and risky. This appears, however, to be an unreal-
istic assumption, since it may be tempting to test a hypothesis
on the physical work environment itself in order to avoid the
strain and uncertainty related to unsupported reasoning in a
complex causal net. For such a task, a designer is supplied with
effective tools such as experimental set-ups, simulation
programs, and computational aids, whereas the operator has
only his or her head and the plant itself. In the actual
situation, no explicit stop rule exists to guide the termination
of conceptual analysis and the start of action. This means that
the definition of error, as seen from the situation of a decision
maker, is very arbitrary. Acts which are quite rational and
important during the search for information and tests of
hypotheses may appear to be unacceptable mistakes with
hindsight, without access to the details of the situation.
Even if a human actor is “synchronized” to the basic
requirements of work by effective procedures, there will be
ample opportunities for modification of such procedures.
Development of expert know-how and rules-of-thumb
depends on adaptation governed by subjective process criteria.
Opportunities for experiments are necessary to find shortcuts
and to identify convenient and reliable cues for action without
analytical diagnosis. In other words, effective, professional
performance depends on empirical correlation of cues to suc-
cessful acts. Humans typically seek the way of least effort.
Therefore, it can be expected that no more information will be
used than is necessary for discrimination among the perceived
alternative for action in any particular situation. This implies
that the choice is “under-specified”11 outside that situation.
When situations change, e.g. due to disturbances or faults in
the system to be controlled, reliance on the usual cues which
are no longer valid will cause an error due to inappropriate
“expectations”. In this way, traps causing systematic mistakes
can be designed into the system. Two types of errors are related
to this kind of adaptation: firstly, the effect of the test of a
hypothesis of salient cues and action which turn out to be
negative and, secondly, the effects of acts chosen from famil-
iar and tested cues when a change in system conditions makes
the perceived set of alternatives unreliable.
An example in which local adaptation is in conflict with
delayed and conditional effects is working instructions which
take into consideration the possible presence of abnormal
conditions that will make certain orders of actions unaccept-
able. The instruction to this effect prescribes a certain
sequence. If this prescribed order is in conflict with the actor’s
immediate process criteria, modification of the prescribed
procedure is very likely and will have no adverse effect in the
daily routine. (If, for instance, an actor has to move back and
forth between several distant locations because that sequence
is safer under certain infrequent risky conditions, his or her
process criterion will rapidly teach him or her to group actions
at the same location together, because this change in the pro-
cedure will have no visible effect under normal circum-
stances.)
Even within an established effective sequence of actions,
adaptation of the patterns of movements will occur according
to subconscious perception of certain process qualities. In a
manual skill, fine-tuning depends upon a continuous updat-
ing of automated patterns of movement to the temporal and
spatial features of the task environment. If the optimization
criteria are speed and smoothness, adaptation can only be
constrained by the occasional experience gained when
crossing the tolerance limits, i.e. by the experience of errors or
near errors (speed–accuracy trade off). Some errors therefore
have a function in maintaining a skill at its proper level, and
they cannot be considered a separable category of events in a
causal chain because they are integral parts of a feedback loop.
Another effect of increasing skill is the evolution of
increasingly long and complex patterns of movements which
could run off without conscious control. During such lengthy
automated patterns, attention is directed towards reviews of
past experience or planning of future needs (fig 6) and
performance is sensitive to interference, i.e. capture from very
familiar cues.
When delayed or conditional global effects of behaviour are
possible, feedback correction and control of the local
adaptation is not possible, and adaptation is controlled by an
evolutionary “survival of the fittest” work process. In order to
compete effectively with the effect of the local process criteria,
the perception of fitness of such stored procedures must be
maintained in another way (e.g. by artificial reinforcement or,
preferably, by rearranging the environment to include the glo-
bal requirements in the local criteria).Otherwise, simple decay
of memory of stored work rules (decay is, in effect, necessary
for adaptation to changing requirements from a work
environment) will necessarily require a repeated experience of
the conflict in order to maintain proper adaptation to charac-
teristics of the environment.
Figure 5 An illustration of the different resource requirements of
different mental strategies. This difference makes a shift in strategy
when faced with difficulties in a task, an effective way to navigate
along the path of least effort, a very popular strategy in skilled
performance to adapt behaviour to immediate work situation.
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The structure of cooperative work
So far, the discussion has been focused on the individual
adaptation of work strategies to task requirements. In general,
however, several people will be active in a work environment,
and the allocation or acceptance of the roles of individuals will
evolve in a self-organizing mode according to local criteria and
within the constraints of externally imposed allocation struc-
tures. Such constraints on the evolutionary allocation can
have their origin in work requirements as well as in human
resource limitations.
Role allocation
Some constraints on work allocation originate in the work
domain. Actions can, for instance, be required simultaneously
in separate locations; or work can require competence which is
dependent on more than one profession. Such conditions will
limit the extent to which allocation can be dynamically
adapted to the preference of the involved individuals. In some
cases, however, constraints are rather lenient and will not be
respected strictly during adaptation (e.g. the boundaries
between activities which have been assigned to members of
different unions by labourmarket agreements). In other cases,
constraints are effectively reinforced, as, for example, when
performance is governed by strict quality control standards, as
is the case for manufacturing according to machining specifi-
cations, or in financial operations with strict legal control. In
most cases, however, boundaries among the roles allocated the
individual actors are continuously adjusted according to the
requirements of the immediate work situation.
As was the case for the choice among alternative work
strategies, the dynamic shifting of boundaries among allo-
cated rules will be used to resolve resource demand conflicts
and to match performance to individual preferences. The sub-
jective criteria active in this adaptation will be very situation-
dependent and directly related to the particular work process,
such as perception of differences in workload among
colleagues, the amount of communication necessary among
agents for coordination, subjective preferences for certain
activities, etc. This adaptation of role allocation and coordina-
tion to work requirements during normal conditions will
endanger functioning during exceptional situations.
Coordination of cooperative work
For concerted work activity, the different processes and func-
tions of work within the various levels of the mean-ends space
of a work domain will be allocated among several individuals.
Often, coordination will be allocated among other individuals
than those directly performing the functions to be coordi-
nated. This is the case in all hierarchic organizations. In effect,
boundaries are found between roles at different levels in the
hierarchical control structure, as well as among roles within
these levels.
Figure 6 An illustration of the complex interaction between the different levels of cognitive control. Tasks are frequently analysed in terms of
sequences of separate acts. In general, however, control of several acts takes place concurrently. At the level of skilled sensory motor control,
activity is like a continuous dynamic interaction with the environment. Attention, on the other hand, is scanning across time and activities in
order to analyse past performance, monitor current activity, and plan for foreseen future requirements. In this way, the internal dynamic world
model is being prepared for oncoming demands, and the related cues and rules are rehearsed and modified to match predicted requirements,
and symbolic reasoning is used to understand responses from the environment and to prepare rules for foreseen but unfamiliar situations.
Attention may not always be focused on current activities, and different levels may simultaneously be involved in the control of different tasks,
related to different time slots, in a time sharing or in a parallel processing mode.
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Figure 7 An illustration of the coordination of cooperative work. At
the level of work, a dynamically changing allocation to individuals is
governed by criteria such as sharing load, minimizing
communication, individual interest, etc. At the level of coordination,
the content of communication necessary for concerted action is
specified by the work content and the actual role allocation. In this
way, the work organization is dynamically shaped bottom up.
Management practice and social values define rules of conduct, i.e.
the form of the coordination, and therefore are shaping the social
organization top down. In addition, formal constraints such as laws,
regulations, and union agreements add constraints on allocation and
coordination “side in”. Within the boundaries defined in this way,
there is plenty of room for adaptation guided by subjective criteria.
Adapted from Rasmussen.12
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The basic structure of the allocation depends on the
functional requirements of the work content, such as the
topographic location of work items, the workload related to
certain functions, the timing required between functions in
different places, and the time frames to consider in coordina-
tion at the various levels. In other words, technology shapes
organizations bottom up by imposing strict constraints on
allocation of functions to groups and individuals. In many
domains, in particular in tightly coupled technical domains
like manufacturing, process control, etc. strict control and
timing requirements can be explicitly formulated from an
analysis of the work requirements (fig 7).
Within the allocation and coordination constraints imposed
by the work content, there are many degrees of freedom to
arrange the role allocation and to structure the way in which
coordination is brought about. Additional formal constraints
on allocation can originate in legal requirements (authoriza-
tion, etc.), agreements (union boundaries), regulations (qual-
ity assurance standards) and rules of conduct (military).
System reliability and safety
The dynamic adaptation to immediate work requirements,
both of individual performance and of the allocation between
individuals, will probably create a very high degree of reliabil-
ity as long as the interaction is transparent (i.e. critical aspects
are visible without excessive delay), and individual process
criteria are not in conflict with, or are not overriding, critical
product criteria.
Under certain conditions, however, self-organizing and
adaptive features will necessarily lead to “catastrophic”
system behaviour unless certain organizational criteria are
met. Adaptation will normally be governed by local criteria,
related to an individual’s perception of process qualities in
order to resolve the perceived degrees of freedom in the
immediate situation. Some critical product criteria (e.g.
safety) are conditionally related to higher level combination or
coincidence of effects of several activities, allocated among
different agents and, probably, in different time slots. The vio-
lation of such high level, conditional criteria cannot be moni-
tored and detected at the local criterion level, and monitoring
by their ultimate criterion effect will be unacceptably delayed.
Catastrophic effects of adaptation can be avoided only if local
activities are tightly monitored with reference to a prediction
of their role in the ultimate conditional effect, i.e. the bounda-
ries at the local activities are necessarily defined by normal
prescriptions, not active functional conditions.
This feature of adaptation to local work requirements prob-
ably constitutes the fallacy of the defence-in-depth design
principle normally applied in high risk industries.13 In systems
designed according to this principle, an accident is dependent
on simultaneous violation of several lines of defence: an
operational disturbance (technical fault or operator error)
must coincide with a latent faulty maintenance condition in
protective systems, with inadequacies in protective barriers,
with inadequate control of the location of people close to the
installation, etc. The activities threatening the various
conditions normally belong to different branches of the
organization. The presence of a potentially catastrophic
combination of the effects of local adaptation to performance
criteria can only be detected at a level in the organization with
the proper overview. However, at this level in the control hier-
archy (organization), the required understanding of condi-
tionally dangerous relations cannot be maintained in the long
term because the required functional and technical knowl-
edge is foreign to the normal management tasks at this level.
The conclusion of this discussion is that catastrophic system
breakdown is a normal feature of systems which have
self-organizing features and, at the same time, depend on pro-
tection against rare combinations of conditions which are
individually affected by adaptation. Safety in such systems
depends on the introduction of locally visible boundaries of
acceptable adaptation and the introduction of related control
mechanisms. What does this mean in terms of organizational
structures? What kind of top down influence from “manage-
ment culture” and bottom up technological constraints can be
used to guide and limit adaptation? How can we model and
predict the evolution of organizational structure?
CONCLUSION
Work in modern “high tech” societies calls for a reconsidera-
tion of the notion of human error: research should be focused
on a general understanding of human behaviour and social
interaction in cognitive terms in complex, dynamic environ-
ments, not on fragments of behaviour called “error”. This
approach has similarities to the “risk homeostasis” theories of
traffic safety, with the reservation that the controlling mecha-
nisms are adaptation in a wider sense than control governed
by criteria related to risk.
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HUMAN ERROR
In the 1970s and 1980s there was great interest among applied
psychologists and systems reliability engineers in analysing
accidents and “near miss” incidents in large scale systems
where public safety was a primary concern. Efforts to define
and develop taxonomies of human error were motivated by
the meltdown at the Three Mile Island power plant near Har-
risbug, PA, by the nuclear plant accident at Chernobyl in the
Soviet Union, by the poison gas release at Bhopal, India, and
by aviation’s most deadly crash of two 747 aircraft at Tenerife
in the Canary Islands. Key to these efforts were the contribu-
tions of Professor Jens Rasmussen of the Riso Energy Labora-
tory and the University of Copenhagen in Denmark.1–3 Riso
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